Welcoming Spaces Interactive map

Our partners at CEPAIM developed an interactive map: interactive map dashboard. This is a digital tool, where those interested have access to information about welcoming spaces in rural and peripheralised regions in Germany, Italy, Poland, The Netherlands and Spain.

Welcoming spaces Interactive map
Welcoming spaces Interactive map

It is possible for users to contribute to the interactive map. They can provide information about their own welcoming initiatives, and they can become connected through this web-based collaborative environment. The mapping of the welcoming initiatives resonates with our aim to create a community of practice, a multi-stakeholder network, where different actors ⎯ from policymakers to practitioners to local community builders who develop or encourage welcoming initiatives ⎯ can learn, share and inspire one another. Additional information about the community of practice and the interactive map can be found in this StoryMap.

“A job is a job”. What do the employment outcomes of Ukrainians refugees mean?

By Jofelle P. Tesorio

This blog is the second of the series that the author is writing about the Ukrainian diaspora at the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Ukrainians refugees have been given a swift entry to the labour market in comparison to other refugee groups, their labour situation appears to be dependent on job availability not so much on skills or education because of, among others, geographical location of the settlement, language, mismatch of skills, and recognition of qualification certificates.

Jobs can mean a community for Ukrainians. During my research, I talked to some women (and very few men) in the peripheral municipalities in Groningen, Netherlands and in Lomża, Poland, to find out the opportunities especially in places far from urban areas and city centres. Almost everyone I spoke to said that having a job is a way to cope, to be independent, and not to think too much about the future and loved ones left behind.

Many have settled in their host countries because of the uncertainty surrounding the prospects of return, and having a job means integrating easily. The EU temporary protection directive (TPD) has given the Ukrainian refugees a shortcut access to the EU labour market without the need for a work permit. At least 40% have found jobs across EU countries, according to OECD. The statistical bureau CBS reported that of the about 65,000 Ukrainians in the Netherlands by the end of 2022, over 30,000 of them are employed. This is equivalent to 46%. Three months after settling in the Netherlands, 36% of Ukrainian refugees work, mostly in the temporary employment sector (41%) or the hospitality industry (20%). The average hourly wage is €14, of which 6% receive less than €11 per hour.

In Poland, by the start of 2023, around 900,000 out of more than 1.5 million Ukrainians have taken up jobs.  According to a survey of the Centre for East European Studies at Warsaw University, 78% of Ukrainians have found work, 12 percentage points higher than the pre-war Ukrainian expat population. The study cited better knowledge of the Polish language among Ukrainians.

While Ukrainian refugees’ early job uptakes are high compared to other refugee groups, what makes these jobs accessible to Ukrainians? Are the right skills and qualifications of Ukrainian refugees being tapped or matched to these jobs? What are the barriers in getting better or suitable job opportunities for them?

The reality on the ground

There may be an abundance of low-skilled jobs especially at the beginning of the war, but finding suitable jobs commensurate with refugees’ educational background and experience remains a challenge.  

Within two months of arrival in the Netherlands, Yuliia (not her real name), a Ukrainian mother of five who lives in Het Hogeland in Groningen province, The Netherlands, found a job packing biscuits at a factory in a nearby village. Her eldest daughter works at the same factory. Another daughter found a job picking and packing flowers at a greenhouse outside Rotterdam through an employment agency.

Since taking on the job, the monthly food and subsistence allowance for them (except for the two minors) was stopped. She has a zero-hour contract, and her work assignments vary, depending on the demand for cakes. Meaning, when there is no work, she doesn’t get paid. There were a couple of months during the winter where she only worked a few days.

“I am twice happy because it is difficult to have a job in this region. We were looking for other jobs all year because this job is not permanent,” she said.

In Lomża, Poland, most of the Ukrainian refugees I spoke to found jobs a few weeks after arrival. Two of them, who worked as cosmetologists in Ukraine, continued this line of work and counted fellow Ukrainians as their clients. One of them goes to Kraków and Lublin, bigger cities outside Lomża, to visit clients. This way, she can augment her income. Although Poland grants Ukrainian refugees the same rights and benefits accorded to Polish nationals, it is not enough to live by in low-waged peripheries like Lomża. In fact, the majority of Ukrainian refugees still live in shelters because they cannot afford to rent even when having jobs.

Barriers to (gainful) employment

Language comes first in the list of challenges in finding employment. Even with low-skilled jobs, they are expected to know the local language. In the beginning, Ukrainian refugees could get jobs quickly because there was a surge of support. In Poland, language is still a barrier but affinity to the Slavic language makes it easier for Ukrainians to learn Polish. Other barriers to employment include the absence of opportunities in many settlement locations, mismatch of skills and qualifications, and recognition of qualification certificates.

“We have someone who was a successful real estate agent in Ukraine with an HBO (higher profession education), but unfortunately the first job she found was cleaning, and also because she doesn’t speak English,” said an employee of a skills training initiative in Groningen region.

However, even high-educated Ukrainians who speak English fluently find it hard to land jobs that match their education and experience. In the Netherlands, many coveted jobs often require a high Dutch proficiency, training, and stringent validation process of diplomas.

“It is not very easy to find a good job without English or Dutch. Either we clean houses or work in farms and factories. To work in a farm or factories, we need a car because they’re too far,” said one Ukrainian who used to be a biology teacher in Ukraine.

Free to settle, free to work and some nuances

The Ukrainians are motivated to get any job, thus, many of the early job uptakes are low-skilled jobs  in factories, hospitality, domestic work, home care, restaurants, retail, and supermarkets. Most of them have higher-than-average level of education.

The case studies in Lomża and Het Hogeland reveal that jobs and geographical location are interlinked. Small municipalities, especially those experiencing depopulation, offer little opportunities for the higher educated and highly skilled. Compounded by low wages and zero-hour contracts, there is a tendency for Ukrainian refugees to re-assess their situation in staying or moving to bigger cities, but there is another problematic issue of housing scarcity.

Since able-bodied men are prevented from leaving Ukraine, the demographic composition of Ukrainians is mostly mothers, the elderly, and minors. This poses a challenge for full employment among adults unless childcare is made available. Many of those I spoke with (in the Netherlands) are working part time with zero-hours contracts because of this reason.

Almost two years on, the absence of a long-term investment for the employment of Ukrainian refugees has put many of them in a vulnerable position despite the free-to-settle, free-to-work scheme. Isn’t it time for the EU or at least on a local level to think of moving from reception to permanent settlement to address the current needs of Ukrainians such as language acquisition, and jobs matching that focus on their actual skills and qualifications? And should it also be a high time to look at the Ukrainian refugee situation as an example in dealing with other refugee groups?

The changing situation of migrants and refugees as a result of “freezing the Polish economy”

12 June 2020

Katarzyna Kubińska (Ocalenie Foundation)

The situation of non-EU migrants in Poland has been affected in different ways through COVID-19 epidemic. Migrants working in the service sector face unemployment, there is limited access to public social assistance (access varies depending on their legal status of the migrant) and also delays in access to legal support have impact on the living conditions of migrants.  

Economic challenges

It is estimated that there are about 1 million migrants in Poland. Most of them are labour force from Ukraine, but there was also a growing number of Belarusians, Moldovans, Georgians, Indians, and Nepalese. In mid-March, the Polish government ordered the closure of all sales and services outlets, except for pharmacies and grocery stores. As a result, thousands of migrants lost their work and the right to social assistance. About 150,000 Ukrainians left Poland in March, which is about 10% of the entire Ukrainian community in Poland. There is no data on how many of them lived in Warsaw. It is also difficult to estimate how many people of other nationalities have left. For many of them leaving for their home countries became impossible due to the suspension of international flights.

One of the examples can be found in the Georgian community. Many Georgians came to Poland on the basis of visa-free travel and, after their period of legal stay expired, they could not legalise their stay and had to work without a work permit. Many people in this situation were employed in Georgian restaurants, popular in Poland. After the economy “froze”, many of them were dismissed immediately, sometimes without getting paid and without any legal basis to claim their rights. Their return to Georgia was not always possible. The Georgian government organised a return plane, but it turned out that the number of seats was insufficient for all interested and the prices exceeded the financial capabilities of those in crisis.

Difficult situation of asylum-seekers

Asylum-seekers who decide to live outside foreigners’ centres receive financial aid, but the money is not enough to cover the cost of living in Warsaw (the aid is less than an average monthly cost of renting a single room). Asylum-seekers have the right to apply for a work permit after 6 months from their application (unless they receive the decision earlier), and most of them find at least part-time employment. When this group of foreigners lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic, the Foreigners’ Office suggested they should return to the centres. However, the centre where the Warsaw based asylum-seeker could return to is several hundred kilometres away from their current location. Asylum-seeker families in Warsaw do not want to return to these centres, because their children would have to change school. In addition, after restrictions are lifted, these families would like to return to Warsaw. Moving back to a centre would mean looking for a flat, work, and school in Warsaw again. The Ocalenie Foundation has stepped in to support migrants through food aid, 391 people in Warsaw with food coupons or food.  

Łomża: Urban area within a shrinking region

The situation of migrants living in Łomża, which is situated in a shrinking region in North-East Poland, is different and to some extent better. Almost all clients of the Ocalenie Foundation are refugees (about 60 families). Only few have lost their right to social assistance for various reasons. As Łomża does not have such a well-developed service sector, which was most affected by the lockdown, people did not lose their jobs as was the case in Warsaw. Migrants working in Łomża usually work in the construction and transport sectors, which have suffered less from the freezing of the economy. Due to the fact that the cost of living in Łomża is much lower, loss of jobs or reduced income have not led to such extreme situations as in Warsaw. The only families who have found themselves in a critical situation are those who have lost their right to social benefits and work due to protracted procedures, delayed court cases or other legal causes.

Poor legal support for refugees

Already before the lockdown, legal assistance to deportees was restricted by physical and administrative barriers and those marked as deportee were taken to an airport or locked in a guarded centre without prior notice. Contact with a lawyer was impeded. Now, the situation has become even more difficult, because the restrictions on contact with a lawyer are explained through epidemiological regulations. The legal situation of people who before the epidemic applied for the extension of their residence card has also become complicated, as border guards in charge of the applications decided that there are reasons to refuse further residence. Their cases must be considered by a court, and from mid-March courts proceed at a slower pace and postpone many cases. This means that some refugees live in a legal vacuum. Their stay permits in Poland are no longer valid, they have lost ability to take up legal work, and they fear deportation.

COVID-19 and the situation of migrants in Poland: Challenges in home schooling and the work situation

By Ewa Jastrzębska and Paulina Legutko-Kobus (SGH Warsaw School of Economics)

In his position dated 13 May 2020, the Commissioner for Human Rights stressed that the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects did do not affect everyone equally. Regularly excluded persons and groups, including refugees and immigrants, are particularly exposed to the consequences of pandemic-related restrictions, such as closed borders and the inability to apply for international protection. In the case of Poland, we see challenges for migrants in home schooling and in the work situation.

One of the areas of exclusion of foreigners, especially children, is home (remote) schooling (which started in Poland on 25 March). Access to home schooling is hindered for children staying in foreigner centers, guarded facilities and those applying for international protection. The main challenge, especially shortly after switching to distance learning, was the lack of computer hardware and equipment for video and audio communication with the teacher. The situation has improved over time owing to citizens’ campaigns and not as a result of systemic solutions. The pandemic has also prevented a significant number of foreign children from participating in extra Polish language classes provided for in the relevant regulations (this is partly managed by cultural assistants, most often volunteers from community or civil society organisations). The deepening of the educational gap among foreign children is also attributed to the lack of or inadequate support from their parents in home schooling. The possible reasons are:

1) the lack of ICT skills and competences (moreover, online communication tools provided by teachers are only in Polish),

2) language barrier: parents do not speak Polish well enough to support their children’s remote education. Parents’ digital exclusion and insufficient conduct of the Polish language also translate into the lack of communication with teachers.

Another challenging area for migrants during the pandemic is the situation on the labour market (especially since many of them operate in the shadow economy, and obtaining work permits during the pandemic is much more difficult).

In March, at the beginning of the pandemic, when the government announced the freezing of the economy and the sealing of state borders, migrants, especially Ukrainians working in Poland, started to leave the country in great numbers. Reasons for leaving Poland were the loss of a job, uncertain future, and vague and unclear communication and information from the government (including the lack of information in languages other than Polish at the beginning of the lock down) coinciding with unclear government messages from Kiev.

It is common property that the “defrosting” of the economy without migrants returning will not go smoothly (about 90% of Ukrainians who left Poland after the lockdown work in catering, services, and the hospitality industry). This is already evident in the agricultural sector which is lacking workforce. For this reason, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Chief Sanitary Inspector issued Guidelines for Agricultural Producers Employing Foreigners for Seasonal Work in the Face of SARS COV-2 (Warsaw, 8 May 2020).

Entrepreneurs are encouraged to get acquainted with the document by the IRIS Ethical Recruitment, COVID-19: Guidance for employers and business to enhance migrant worker protection during the current health crisis. The Responsible Business Forum, a renowned organisation promoting the subject of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), has also drawn up guidelines on how business can support employees from Ukraine.

In a sociological study conducted on 9-15 April, foreign employees, who stayed in Poland for the period of the pandemic, clearly respond (85% of respondents) that they prefer to stay in Poland because of their earnings and work opportunities. 26.6% of them admit that they were forced to change their sector of employment because of the pandemic. The surveyed foreigners feel safer in Poland than in their own country (72.5%) and, just like Poles, they are mostly concerned about losing their job due to the COVID-19 pandemic (57.8%).

In conclusion, the situation in the country is dynamic and it is worth waiting for further government decisions regarding restrictions on mobility, especially considering the important role of foreigners (e.g., from Ukraine) for the domestic labour market.