The Netherlands | Welcoming Spaces

“A job is a job”. What do the employment outcomes of Ukrainians refugees mean?

By Jofelle P. Tesorio

This blog is the second of the series that the author is writing about the Ukrainian diaspora at the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Ukrainians refugees have been given a swift entry to the labour market in comparison to other refugee groups, their labour situation appears to be dependent on job availability not so much on skills or education because of, among others, geographical location of the settlement, language, mismatch of skills, and recognition of qualification certificates.

Jobs can mean a community for Ukrainians. During my research, I talked to some women (and very few men) in the peripheral municipalities in Groningen, Netherlands and in Lomża, Poland, to find out the opportunities especially in places far from urban areas and city centres. Almost everyone I spoke to said that having a job is a way to cope, to be independent, and not to think too much about the future and loved ones left behind.

Many have settled in their host countries because of the uncertainty surrounding the prospects of return, and having a job means integrating easily. The EU temporary protection directive (TPD) has given the Ukrainian refugees a shortcut access to the EU labour market without the need for a work permit. At least 40% have found jobs across EU countries, according to OECD. The statistical bureau CBS reported that of the about 65,000 Ukrainians in the Netherlands by the end of 2022, over 30,000 of them are employed. This is equivalent to 46%. Three months after settling in the Netherlands, 36% of Ukrainian refugees work, mostly in the temporary employment sector (41%) or the hospitality industry (20%). The average hourly wage is €14, of which 6% receive less than €11 per hour.

In Poland, by the start of 2023, around 900,000 out of more than 1.5 million Ukrainians have taken up jobs. According to a survey of the Centre for East European Studies at Warsaw University, 78% of Ukrainians have found work, 12 percentage points higher than the pre-war Ukrainian expat population. The study cited better knowledge of the Polish language among Ukrainians.

While Ukrainian refugees’ early job uptakes are high compared to other refugee groups, what makes these jobs accessible to Ukrainians? Are the right skills and qualifications of Ukrainian refugees being tapped or matched to these jobs? What are the barriers in getting better or suitable job opportunities for them?

The reality on the ground

There may be an abundance of low-skilled jobs especially at the beginning of the war, but finding suitable jobs commensurate with refugees’ educational background and experience remains a challenge.

Within two months of arrival in the Netherlands, Yuliia (not her real name), a Ukrainian mother of five who lives in Het Hogeland in Groningen province, The Netherlands, found a job packing biscuits at a factory in a nearby village. Her eldest daughter works at the same factory. Another daughter found a job picking and packing flowers at a greenhouse outside Rotterdam through an employment agency.

Since taking on the job, the monthly food and subsistence allowance for them (except for the two minors) was stopped. She has a zero-hour contract, and her work assignments vary, depending on the demand for cakes. Meaning, when there is no work, she doesn’t get paid. There were a couple of months during the winter where she only worked a few days.

“I am twice happy because it is difficult to have a job in this region. We were looking for other jobs all year because this job is not permanent,” she said.

In Lomża, Poland, most of the Ukrainian refugees I spoke to found jobs a few weeks after arrival. Two of them, who worked as cosmetologists in Ukraine, continued this line of work and counted fellow Ukrainians as their clients. One of them goes to Kraków and Lublin, bigger cities outside Lomża, to visit clients. This way, she can augment her income. Although Poland grants Ukrainian refugees the same rights and benefits accorded to Polish nationals, it is not enough to live by in low-waged peripheries like Lomża. In fact, the majority of Ukrainian refugees still live in shelters because they cannot afford to rent even when having jobs.

Barriers to (gainful) employment

Language comes first in the list of challenges in finding employment. Even with low-skilled jobs, they are expected to know the local language. In the beginning, Ukrainian refugees could get jobs quickly because there was a surge of support. In Poland, language is still a barrier but affinity to the Slavic language makes it easier for Ukrainians to learn Polish. Other barriers to employment include the absence of opportunities in many settlement locations, mismatch of skills and qualifications, and recognition of qualification certificates.

“We have someone who was a successful real estate agent in Ukraine with an HBO (higher profession education), but unfortunately the first job she found was cleaning, and also because she doesn’t speak English,” said an employee of a skills training initiative in Groningen region.

However, even high-educated Ukrainians who speak English fluently find it hard to land jobs that match their education and experience. In the Netherlands, many coveted jobs often require a high Dutch proficiency, training, and stringent validation process of diplomas.

“It is not very easy to find a good job without English or Dutch. Either we clean houses or work in farms and factories. To work in a farm or factories, we need a car because they’re too far,” said one Ukrainian who used to be a biology teacher in Ukraine.

Free to settle, free to work and some nuances

The Ukrainians are motivated to get any job, thus, many of the early job uptakes are low-skilled jobs in factories, hospitality, domestic work, home care, restaurants, retail, and supermarkets. Most of them have higher-than-average level of education.

The case studies in Lomża and Het Hogeland reveal that jobs and geographical location are interlinked. Small municipalities, especially those experiencing depopulation, offer little opportunities for the higher educated and highly skilled. Compounded by low wages and zero-hour contracts, there is a tendency for Ukrainian refugees to re-assess their situation in staying or moving to bigger cities, but there is another problematic issue of housing scarcity.

Since able-bodied men are prevented from leaving Ukraine, the demographic composition of Ukrainians is mostly mothers, the elderly, and minors. This poses a challenge for full employment among adults unless childcare is made available. Many of those I spoke with (in the Netherlands) are working part time with zero-hours contracts because of this reason.

Almost two years on, the absence of a long-term investment for the employment of Ukrainian refugees has put many of them in a vulnerable position despite the free-to-settle, free-to-work scheme. Isn’t it time for the EU or at least on a local level to think of moving from reception to permanent settlement to address the current needs of Ukrainians such as language acquisition, and jobs matching that focus on their actual skills and qualifications? And should it also be a high time to look at the Ukrainian refugee situation as an example in dealing with other refugee groups?

Dutch Welcoming Spaces in Covid-19 times

3 June 2020

By Rianne Hadders, Jana Finke and Marlies Meier

The Covid-19 crisis highlights inequalities and the position of lower-skilled migrants in the Dutch society. For example, due to the crisis, the harsh living and working circumstances of many seasonal workers in the agricultural sector was highlighted in mainstream media. The workers union FNV called for attention as workers often are placed by their employment agency in holiday parks where they have to share rooms with multiple people. Keeping the 1.5 metres distance is impossible there. Various agencies were also fined because they were transporting the people in full buses to their employment site.

The effects of such circumstances are reflected in the findings by the Statistics Agency Netherlands (CBS). They found that migrant’s health is more at risk during the COVID-19 crisis. The death rate for people with migration background (second and first generation) within the first six weeks of the pandemic (until mid-April) was 50 percent higher than the expected death rate. For those without migrant background the rate was only 40 percent higher than expected. Possible explanations are the relatively high number of migrants working in professions that require contact or cannot be done from home, such as the aforementioned example. Other factors may be a lack of access to official information in a language they understand, and the wider spread of risk factors among migrant groups (e.g. diabetes).

The effects of covid-19 measures on asylum seekers and asylum processes

In the Netherlands, everyone is restricted in their mobility; people are asked to stay home as much as possible. However, it is allowed to go out for a walk and relax at the park. For people living in asylum seekers’ reception centres, the mobility is far more restricted and everyday more intensely affected by the restrictions. This is because asylum seeker accommodation (AZC) in the Netherlands mainly takes place on a large scale with many people living in one place. As contamination might happen easier due to the shared facilities and limited space per person, measures for them are even stricter than for the broader population.

For asylum seekers in particular, the impacts go beyond their living situation in the asylum centres. The Dutch immigration authorities halted all operations (the processing of asylum procedures) except for emergency ones. Those who intended to claim asylum during the Covid-19 crisis are provided with emergency accommodation, which is collective accommodation.

In the midst of halted and delayed admission processes two interesting exceptions can be observed, related to the interest of the Dutch society in the current crisis. Specifically, migrants working in the agricultural sector as well as migrants with a medical professional background receive special treatment. The Dutch farming sector depends to a large extend on the labour of seasonal workers from Eastern European countries. While at first the possibilities for workers to enter the Netherlands for the asparagus and strawberry harvest season seemed limited due to border closing and the cutting of transportation, access has in the end been allowed and suitable transport has been arranged widely so that hundreds of migrant workers could cross into the Netherlands’ fields. While the recognition procedure of diplomas for migrant medical professionals from countries like Syria and other non-EU countries is rather complicated and lengthy , it seems to become easier for doctors were not yet officially allowed to get to work, as the Covid-19 regulations that led to exemptions in the regulations. While there are still quite some requirements that have to be met, working under supervision of another registered doctor is possible for asylum seekers with a medical professional background who are still in the recognition procedure. Even some people who are still in their asylum request procedure were admitted to work in hospitals temporarily (COA).

Thus, in addition to the acute negative health impacts for migrants, some have speculated that this crisis underlines their importance to keep the economy afloat, which can lead to better treatment for those who are seen to be of immediate use for the economy.

Responses in shrinking regions

At the moment it is difficult to identify how depopulating regions will be affected by the Corona virus. Projects that stimulate interactions between migrants and other inhabitants of these regions have been put on hold, and also meeting places (community centres) have been closed. However, some activities have successfully shifted to online support. Our students working on welcoming spaces in shrinking areas have also observed a shift in the functions of the welcoming initiatives. For example, an initiative in the Limburg region signaled that the migrants they were supporting did not understood the messages from the government and took up the task to translate all statements to Arabic and opened a helpline. Currently, they are hosting online language-cafes, but volunteers identified they mainly use these interactions to check on the wellbeing of the refugees in the current crisis.

Nevertheless, for many initiatives the Covid-19 crisis causes immediate financial problems, and their future is unsure. This implies that possibilities for interactions, casual encounters and meeting each other more in structured ways have become very limited. Migrants can be affected in negative ways, as their ties within the local community are often less strong; or they may be advantaged, as their online ties are stronger. Both hypotheses have been raised.

Additionally, some argue that the countryside is the future: less crowded, more (socially) cohesive, and potentially thriving with a renewed interests in local food production. Also living in lower densities is advantageous: currently the (predominantly rural and sparsely populated) North of the Netherlands is hardly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Rural communities are believed to be more resilient in a lock down situation. Neighbors always have been more dependent on community care, as formal and commercial services are distanced or absent. Green space is nearby and accessible. Generally speaking, people living in rural (and shrinking) areas are less affected by a lockdown, than those living in urban areas.