“A job is a job”. What do the employment outcomes of Ukrainians refugees mean?

By Jofelle P. Tesorio

This blog is the second of the series that the author is writing about the Ukrainian diaspora at the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Ukrainians refugees have been given a swift entry to the labour market in comparison to other refugee groups, their labour situation appears to be dependent on job availability not so much on skills or education because of, among others, geographical location of the settlement, language, mismatch of skills, and recognition of qualification certificates.

Jobs can mean a community for Ukrainians. During my research, I talked to some women (and very few men) in the peripheral municipalities in Groningen, Netherlands and in Lomża, Poland, to find out the opportunities especially in places far from urban areas and city centres. Almost everyone I spoke to said that having a job is a way to cope, to be independent, and not to think too much about the future and loved ones left behind.

Many have settled in their host countries because of the uncertainty surrounding the prospects of return, and having a job means integrating easily. The EU temporary protection directive (TPD) has given the Ukrainian refugees a shortcut access to the EU labour market without the need for a work permit. At least 40% have found jobs across EU countries, according to OECD. The statistical bureau CBS reported that of the about 65,000 Ukrainians in the Netherlands by the end of 2022, over 30,000 of them are employed. This is equivalent to 46%. Three months after settling in the Netherlands, 36% of Ukrainian refugees work, mostly in the temporary employment sector (41%) or the hospitality industry (20%). The average hourly wage is €14, of which 6% receive less than €11 per hour.

In Poland, by the start of 2023, around 900,000 out of more than 1.5 million Ukrainians have taken up jobs.  According to a survey of the Centre for East European Studies at Warsaw University, 78% of Ukrainians have found work, 12 percentage points higher than the pre-war Ukrainian expat population. The study cited better knowledge of the Polish language among Ukrainians.

While Ukrainian refugees’ early job uptakes are high compared to other refugee groups, what makes these jobs accessible to Ukrainians? Are the right skills and qualifications of Ukrainian refugees being tapped or matched to these jobs? What are the barriers in getting better or suitable job opportunities for them?

The reality on the ground

There may be an abundance of low-skilled jobs especially at the beginning of the war, but finding suitable jobs commensurate with refugees’ educational background and experience remains a challenge.  

Within two months of arrival in the Netherlands, Yuliia (not her real name), a Ukrainian mother of five who lives in Het Hogeland in Groningen province, The Netherlands, found a job packing biscuits at a factory in a nearby village. Her eldest daughter works at the same factory. Another daughter found a job picking and packing flowers at a greenhouse outside Rotterdam through an employment agency.

Since taking on the job, the monthly food and subsistence allowance for them (except for the two minors) was stopped. She has a zero-hour contract, and her work assignments vary, depending on the demand for cakes. Meaning, when there is no work, she doesn’t get paid. There were a couple of months during the winter where she only worked a few days.

“I am twice happy because it is difficult to have a job in this region. We were looking for other jobs all year because this job is not permanent,” she said.

In Lomża, Poland, most of the Ukrainian refugees I spoke to found jobs a few weeks after arrival. Two of them, who worked as cosmetologists in Ukraine, continued this line of work and counted fellow Ukrainians as their clients. One of them goes to Kraków and Lublin, bigger cities outside Lomża, to visit clients. This way, she can augment her income. Although Poland grants Ukrainian refugees the same rights and benefits accorded to Polish nationals, it is not enough to live by in low-waged peripheries like Lomża. In fact, the majority of Ukrainian refugees still live in shelters because they cannot afford to rent even when having jobs.

Barriers to (gainful) employment

Language comes first in the list of challenges in finding employment. Even with low-skilled jobs, they are expected to know the local language. In the beginning, Ukrainian refugees could get jobs quickly because there was a surge of support. In Poland, language is still a barrier but affinity to the Slavic language makes it easier for Ukrainians to learn Polish. Other barriers to employment include the absence of opportunities in many settlement locations, mismatch of skills and qualifications, and recognition of qualification certificates.

“We have someone who was a successful real estate agent in Ukraine with an HBO (higher profession education), but unfortunately the first job she found was cleaning, and also because she doesn’t speak English,” said an employee of a skills training initiative in Groningen region.

However, even high-educated Ukrainians who speak English fluently find it hard to land jobs that match their education and experience. In the Netherlands, many coveted jobs often require a high Dutch proficiency, training, and stringent validation process of diplomas.

“It is not very easy to find a good job without English or Dutch. Either we clean houses or work in farms and factories. To work in a farm or factories, we need a car because they’re too far,” said one Ukrainian who used to be a biology teacher in Ukraine.

Free to settle, free to work and some nuances

The Ukrainians are motivated to get any job, thus, many of the early job uptakes are low-skilled jobs  in factories, hospitality, domestic work, home care, restaurants, retail, and supermarkets. Most of them have higher-than-average level of education.

The case studies in Lomża and Het Hogeland reveal that jobs and geographical location are interlinked. Small municipalities, especially those experiencing depopulation, offer little opportunities for the higher educated and highly skilled. Compounded by low wages and zero-hour contracts, there is a tendency for Ukrainian refugees to re-assess their situation in staying or moving to bigger cities, but there is another problematic issue of housing scarcity.

Since able-bodied men are prevented from leaving Ukraine, the demographic composition of Ukrainians is mostly mothers, the elderly, and minors. This poses a challenge for full employment among adults unless childcare is made available. Many of those I spoke with (in the Netherlands) are working part time with zero-hours contracts because of this reason.

Almost two years on, the absence of a long-term investment for the employment of Ukrainian refugees has put many of them in a vulnerable position despite the free-to-settle, free-to-work scheme. Isn’t it time for the EU or at least on a local level to think of moving from reception to permanent settlement to address the current needs of Ukrainians such as language acquisition, and jobs matching that focus on their actual skills and qualifications? And should it also be a high time to look at the Ukrainian refugee situation as an example in dealing with other refugee groups?

Where are the displaced Ukrainians now?

By Jofelle P. Tesorio

This blog is the first of the series that the author is writing about the Ukrainian diaspora at the onset of the Russia’s war against Ukraine. This provides a general overview where the Ukrainians have ended up in Europe, particularly those who have landed in The Netherlands after fleeing Ukraine; how some of them receded in cities and others in peripheral areas, and the existing conditions at their housing locations. This output is collated based on information and publicly available documents and from interviews with Ukrainian refugees and the people involved with reception and integration in selected areas.

In this first blog, the following question is discussed: Displaced Ukrainians have been given a free will to go anywhere in the EU, and if we track their mobilities, what does this tell us?

Entering its second year, Russia’s war against Ukraine is not abating and more Ukrainians are staying in host countries rather than returning. Since February 24, 2022, UNHCR has recorded almost 6 million individual refugees from Ukraine across Europe and almost 25 million recorded crossings from Ukraine and back through border countries. These mobility flows show one of the most complex and enormous  movements of people from one country within a short span of time. More than 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced.

Ukrainian women preparing dumplings during neighbors’ day in Groningen Province, the Netherlands. Photo: Jofelle Tesorio/Welcoming Spaces

Poland has received the greatest number of displaced Ukrainians based on applications under the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) – approximately 1.6 million refugees as of November 2023, followed by Germany (1,1 million), Czech Republic (574,550), United Kingdom (246,760 ), Spain (185,870 ), Italy (168,725), Bulgaria (171,805 ), Romania (147,695), Slovakia (131,745), Netherlands (136,470), Moldova (113,130 , Austria (106,215), France (69,495), Belgium (73,095), Switzerland (66,505), and Turkey (42,875), based on November 2023 data. According to UNHCR, Russia, has approximately 1.2 millionUkrainian refugees recorded. Interestingly, France Turkey and Switzerland in October 2022 had about 118,994; 95,874; and 80,324 registered Ukrainians respectively. By October 2023, the number of those who applied under the TPD, or similar temporary protection measures (for non-EU countries) has significantly decreased. One explanation would be because the TPD allows Ukrainian refugees to freely move to another country (for new opportunities, better wages, social and family network, and other factors) or as reports also show, many have returned home.

The infographic below shows the representative flows of Ukrainian refugees to (other) European countries, with Germany and Poland being the biggest host countries. For updated and real-time figures and infographics, follow the EU and Eurostat websites.

Infographic 1. European countries where Ukrainian refugees are hosted. Source: EU/Eurostat

In the context of migration within Europe before 2022, there had been a substantial number of Ukrainians living in Europe with resident permits (see the map below). Poland had 651,221 followed by Italy (230,336) and Czech Republic (193,547). In relation to the size of their population, Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovakia were the EU-member states with the largest number of Ukrainian citizens holding valid residence permits at the end of 2021, according to Eurostat.

Infographic 2. Ukrainian citizens with valid resident permit in the EU before February 2022. Source: Eurostat

The data on the Ukrainian diaspora before 2022 by the European Commission revealed that 57.3% were given resident permits because of work, 20% because of family, 2.5% for education reasons, and only 0.6% because of protection status. The picture turned completely different by spring of 2022.

While most Ukrainian refugees had free-willingly chosen their destinations by virtue of the TPD, some have ended in places like a lottery because of shortage of accommodations in almost all cities and urban areas across Europe.

 Spontaneous flow (or not)

Did the displaced Ukrainians go to areas where Ukrainian communities and network were already in place, randomly, or consciously weighing level of opportunities, higher wages, benefits, and quality of life?

The assumption was that the new flow of Ukrainian refugees will follow the same route. However, the TPD, which has allowed a free flow of people fleeing from Ukraine and seek protection in any country of their choosing, has disrupted this pattern. In my research, I call this ‘spontaneous process of dispersion’ where in a very short amount of time millions of Ukrainians have ended up in different parts of Europe and elsewhere in the world where similar protection mechanisms are in place.

The flow of Ukrainian refugees suggests a few patterns that can be useful in tracking settlement practices, by circumstances or by choice. The choice of settlement was influenced both by the temporary protection status in the European countries and the willingness and capacities of the countries, cities, and municipalities. Also, the attitudes of locals and welcoming initiatives available played a role in the short-term and long term reception and settlement.

The statistics suggest that Ukrainian refugees often navigate to urban places (but not necessarily in capital cities) and to places where there is already an existing diaspora, like in the case of Italy where the four regions with the highest number of Ukrainian refugees are Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Campania, and Lazio. These are all areas with a significant presence of Ukrainian communities before 2022. In Campania, for example, they represent a large share of the total number of non-EU citizens living in the region.

In the Netherlands, before 2022, people of Ukrainian origin were mostly found in and around Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam, and other cities like Eindhoven, Groningen, Maastricht and Enschede. Most of these cities already had a Ukrainian diaspora.

While it is yet premature to draw conclusions, statistics do show that urban areas are often attractive because of opportunities, and provide important networks, and therefore Ukrainian refugees flock to that direction.

On the other hand, it is also interesting to see the presence of Ukrainian refugees in smaller villages and places that are experiencing depopulation like Lomza in Poland and Het Hogeland and Pekela in the Netherlands. Most Ukrainians who ended up  in smaller cities or villages do not have a network. In these places , the Ukrainian diaspora is small or was even non-existent before 2022.

Outflows of Ukrainian refugees from Poland, France, Sweden and Czech Republic are also noticeable. Statistics show that the number of registered Ukrainians in these countries has decreased compared last year. The total picture where the Ukrainians from these countries moved or whether they have come back to Ukraine and for what reasons is worth investigating.

On the other hand, Germany has recorded an uptick in registration. The Netherlands has also recorded an increase, from approximately 85,000 in November 2022, it is now approximately at 136,000.

Lastly, the distribution of Ukrainian refugees in Europe is lopsided. Germany has been echoing the sentiments of countries like Poland, Czech Republic, and other countries bordering Ukraine – Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Moldova – say they cannot longer cope with the wave of Ukrainian refugees. Non-border countries like Italy and Spain have less than 200,000 each, but had almost the same number of Ukrainian diaspora before 2022. Across Europe, there are both local and national discussions about equitable allocation of Ukrainians as a shared burden and responsibility. This is something to follow.

For the next blog, while numbers have shown that there is a sort of stabilisation in mobility flows of Ukrainians, some countries witness a decrease, either because Ukrainians moved to other countries or went back to Ukraine. Based on initial empirical data collected within the Welcoming Spaces and other research, job opportunities, housing situation, education for children, language, and social benefits are some factors that make Ukrainians stay, move elsewhere or go back to Ukraine.  I will look at the early job uptake for Ukrainians and how this affects their mobilities.